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A MODEST PROPOSAL:   
ABOLISHING AGENCY INDEPENDENCE IN  





Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board1
Free Enterprise Fund raises a question of first impression:  may 
executive branch officers, such as members of the PCAOB, be insulated 
from the President’s oversight and removal power by two layers of tenure 
protection?  The PCAOB was created by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 
(the Act)
 
outlines a modest proposal for abolishing agency independence.  The U.S. 
Supreme Court’s decision creates a framework for challenging the 
constitutionality of agency independence and the restrictions on removal 
that shield the heads of independent agencies from presidential oversight.  
In the course of assessing the constitutionality of the Public Company 
Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB or Board), the Court provides the 
reasoning for undermining most forms of agency independence.  Yet the 
potential scope of the decision has gone largely unnoticed.  Most 
commentators have pronounced the decision insignificant for presidential 
authority.  This Article questions the conventional interpretation and 
demonstrates that the structure of the Court’s argument, which focuses on 
the importance of presidential control and accountability through the 
removal power, logically calls into question the constitutionality of agency 
independence.  Moreover, the Court’s remedy of severing invalid for-cause 
removal limits provides a workable approach for future cases—eliminating 
agency independence without eliminating the independent agencies.  
2 in response to a number of high-profile corporate and accounting 
scandals.  The Act gives the Board wide-ranging authority over accounting 
firms that audit publicly held companies.3
 
*  Assistant Professor of Law, George Mason University School of Law.  For their helpful 
comments, I thank Jonathan Adler, Ross Davies, Gary Lawson, John Manning, Gillian 
Metzger, Aaron Saiger, Peter Strauss, Robert Vaughn, Stephen Vladeck, Todd Zywicki, and 
participants at the Fordham Law School Symposium on “Presidential Influence over 
Administrative Action” and the Judges and Judging Workshop at American University 
Washington College of Law. 
  Under the Act, Commissioners 
of the Securities and Exchange Commission (Commission or SEC) appoint 
members of the Board and Board members can be removed by 
 1. 130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010). 
 2. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745. 
 3. 15 U.S.C. §§ 7211–7215 (2006) (outlining the responsibilities of the Board). 
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Commissioners only “for good cause shown.”4  The Commissioners, in 
turn, can be removed by the President only for inefficiency, neglect of duty, 
or malfeasance in office—creating the double for-cause removal protection 
over the Board.  The Court holds this double layer contravenes separation 
of powers because the President “cannot ‘take Care that the Laws be 
faithfully executed’ if he cannot oversee the faithfulness of the officers who 
execute them.”5
The Court emphasizes that the Board enjoys an unusual double layer of 
for-cause removal protection and purports to limit the scope of its decision 
to this arrangement.
 
6  Nonetheless, in the course of reaching its conclusion, 
the Court articulates a series of principles, a sort of proof, for the 
unconstitutionality of agency independence.  Writing for the 5-4 majority, 
Chief Justice John Roberts calls the question presented a “modest” one that 
does not challenge for-cause limitations in general.7
The Court articulates three fundamental principles that lead to its 
conclusion that the Act’s for-cause removal provisions are unconstitutional: 
  Yet the Chief Justice 
answers the modest question with ambitious constitutional principles that 
logically challenge most for-cause removal restrictions.  The Court’s 
reasoning strongly suggests that statutory limits on the President’s removal 
power, such as those protecting the officers of the independent agencies, are 
unconstitutional. 
First, the Court establishes that the President must oversee the work of 
the executive branch.  This premise stems from separation of powers, the 
vesting of the executive power in the President, and the singular 
responsibility of the President to the people for the faithful execution of the 
laws.8
Second, the Court argues that presidential oversight requires the capacity 
to remove subordinate officers.  The President cannot fully oversee 
subordinate officers if he cannot remove them from office when they fail to 
faithfully execute the law.  For the President to be held accountable for the 
work of the executive branch, he must be able to hold his subordinates 
accountable, by removal if necessary.  Other methods of control cannot 
substitute for the removal power.
 
9
Third, a statute cannot diminish or modify the President’s removal 
power, because removal provides a key constitutional means for the 
President to resist legislative encroachments and ensure adequate control 
over the executive branch.
 
10
QED:  From these general principles, the Court concludes that the 
Board’s two layers of for-cause removal protection are unconstitutional.  As 
a remedy, however, the Court does not enjoin the operations of the Board.  
 
 
 4. Id. § 7211(e)(6); see also id. § 7217(d)(3). 
 5. Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3147 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II). 
 6. Id. at 3147. 
 7. Id. at 3157. 
 8. Id. at 3151–57. See infra Part II.A. 
 9. Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3158–59. See infra Part II.B. 
 10. Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3154 n.4. See infra Part II.C. 
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Instead, it severs the for-cause removal protections that insulate the Board 
from the Commission.11
As a result of the Court’s decision, the Board can proceed with its 
statutory functions, but with the possibility of at-will removal by the SEC.  
The SEC Commissioners, however, can be removed by the President only 
for cause, as the parties to the case stipulated.  The Court decides the case 
with this understanding and does not reexamine the precedents upholding 
single layer restrictions on the President’s removal power.
    
12  Therefore, the 
Court leaves Board members subject to removal by the SEC, an 
independent agency.  The President’s control over the Board only 
marginally increases, which leads a number of commentators to call the 
case “symbolic”—an insignificant win for proponents of the unitary 
executive theory.13
Yet the Court’s reasoning proves both too much and too little for the case 
at hand, which deals with the relatively unusual circumstance of two levels 
of for-cause protections insulating the Board.  The broad principles about 
presidential control over the executive branch go too far for the Court’s 
ultimate conclusion that the SEC—an independent agency operating 
without full presidential control—may provide constitutionally adequate 
oversight for the Board.   
 
The disconnect between the reasoning and the remedy implicitly raises 
the question:  if two levels are unconstitutional, why not one?  The Court’s 
only answer to this is that the Court, not the Constitution, has previously 
allowed limitations on the President’s removal power:  “Since 1789, the 
Constitution has been understood to empower the President to keep 
[executive] officers accountable—by removing them from office, if 
necessary.  This Court has determined, however, that this authority is not 
without limit.”14  The Court’s precedents such as Humphrey’s Executor v. 
United States15
This tension in the Court’s opinion sets the foundation for a wider assault 
on agency independence.  The proof applies logically to the more ordinary 
first layer of agency independence.  First, the President must oversee 
 and subsequent cases sustained statutory limits on the 
President’s removal power.  Although these precedents are not challenged 
in this case, the Court makes clear that there may be a gap between the 
Court’s precedents and the Constitution.  The Court’s reasoning fails to 
explain how two layers of removal protection differ from one.    
 
 11. Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3161–62. 
    12.  Id. at 3147 (“The parties do not ask us to reexamine any of these precedents, and we 
do not do so.”). 
 13. See, e.g., Rick Pildes, The Unitary Executive, Administrative Agencies, and the 
Supreme Court, BALKINIZATION, (May 18, 2009, 10:36 AM), 
http://balkin.blogspot.com/2009/05/unitary-executive-administrative.html; see infra notes 
51–53 and accompanying text. 
 14. Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3146 (emphasis added) (citing Humphrey’s 
Executor, 295 U.S. 602, 620 (1935); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926)). 
 15. 295 U.S. at 628–30 (upholding the constitutionality of statutory limitations on the 
President’s removal power with regard to the Commissioners of the Federal Trade 
Commission). 
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executive branch officials.  Second, oversight requires the ability to remove 
such officials.  Third, the President’s removal power cannot be diminished 
or modified by statute.  QED:  The first layer of agency independence is 
unconstitutional because it insulates the heads of independent agencies from 
the President’s removal power and consequently contravenes the 
constitutional structure that vests the executive power and accountability for 
the executive branch in the President.  The Court’s logic can lead to the 
conclusion that even one layer of for-cause removal protection is 
unconstitutional.  The proof can be applied beyond the narrow question 
presented here to the wider battle over agency independence. 
Furthermore, the Court’s severance remedy increases the possibility that 
the decision may have a further reach because it separates independence 
from the independent agencies.  The Court severs the Board’s for-cause 
removal protections, which leaves the Board intact, but subject to removal 
by the SEC.  As the Court explains, “[T]he existence of the Board does not 
violate the separation of powers, but the substantive removal restrictions 
imposed by [the statute] do.”16
The Chief Justice’s opinion in time may be viewed like Marbury v. 
Madison,
  Similarly, severing one layer of agency 
independence would make the officers of an independent agency subject to 
at-will removal by the President, but it would not otherwise alter the 
statutory responsibilities of the agency.  Congress might wish to restructure 
agencies that lose their independence, but the judicial remedy would be 
relatively narrow; it would bring agencies under presidential control, but 
not abolish them altogether.  Both the proof and remedy proposed by the 
Court resolve the narrow question about the PCAOB, but they gesture 
toward more.  The Court has made a modest proposal for abolishing agency 
independence. 
17
This Article focuses on the possible implications of Free Enterprise 
Fund for the constitutionality of agency independence.
 reaching a narrow result on the immediate controversy at 
issue—the Board continues largely as before—while staking out ground for 
a judicial incursion against agency independence.  As in Marbury, the Chief 
Justice could have gone a number of different directions, but the decision 
reaches a result that minimizes political opposition, while leaving open the 
possibility for more significant impact in future decisions.  To see this case 
as inconsequential is to miss the forest for the trees. 
18  The Article first 
explains the background of the PCAOB case, the Supreme Court’s decision, 
and responses to the case.19
 
 16. Id. at 3161. 
  Next, it sets out the Court’s proof for why the 
 17. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
 18. This Article does not take up the broader questions about the appropriate scope of 
the removal power, which are discussed in greater detail by other scholars. See generally, 
Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the Laws, 
104 YALE L.J. 541, 642–45 (1994); Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and 
the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 2 (1994); Geoffrey P. Miller, Independent 
Agencies, 1986 SUP. CT. REV. 41, 42–43; Saikrishna Prakash, New Light on the Decision of 
1789, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 1021, 1022–23 (2006). 
 19. See infra Part I. 
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Board is unconstitutional and examines how the Court’s focus on formal, 
structural principles applies beyond the facts of this case.20  Then, the 
Article explains how the Court’s proof—its emphasis on the importance of 
presidential control and accountability—calls into question the 
constitutionality of agency independence more generally.21
I.  BACKGROUND OF FREE ENTERPRISE FUND V. PCAOB AND REACTIONS 
TO THE DECISION 
  Finally, it 
presents evidence that the Court may be receptive to reconsidering its 
earlier precedents and suggests some implications for future challenges to 
the constitutionality of agency independence.   
A.  Summary of the Case 
As part of accounting and financial services reforms in the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act, Congress created the PCAOB to standardize and regulate the 
auditing of public companies.  Accounting firms that audit publicly traded 
companies must register with the Board22 and must comply with auditing 
and other standards issued by the Board.23  The Board must regularly 
inspect registered accounting firms and has authority to conduct 
investigations of any action or practice that may violate the Act, the 
securities laws, the Board’s rules, or the SEC’s rules.24  The Board was 
modeled on private self-regulatory organizations such as the New York 
Stock Exchange, but “[u]nlike the self-regulatory organizations . . . the 
Board is a Government-created, Government-appointed entity, with 
expansive powers to govern an entire industry.”25
The Commission appoints the five members of the Board and oversees 
their issuance of rules and imposition of sanctions.
 
26  The Commission can 
remove Board members only “for good cause shown” and in accordance 
with certain procedures.27  The standard for removal is “unusually high,” as 
the Court observed.28  In order to remove a Board member, the Commission 
must make a finding on the record, after notice and opportunity for a 
hearing, that (1) the Board member willfully violated the Act, the rules of 
the Board, or the securities laws, (2) willfully abused his authority, or (3) 
failed to enforce compliance by an accounting firm of relevant statutory 
provisions or professional standards.29
Beckstead and Watts, LLP, a Nevada accounting firm, registered with the 
Board.  After the Board released a report critical of the firm’s auditing 
 
 
 20. See infra Part II. 
 21. See infra Part III. 
 22. 15 U.S.C. § 7212(a) (2006). 
 23. Id. § 7213(a)(1). 
 24. Id. §§ 7214–7215. 
 25. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3147 
(2010). 
 26. 15 U.S.C. §§ 7211(e)(1), 7217(b)–(c). 
 27. Id. § 7211(e)(6). 
 28. Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3158. 
 29. 15 U.S.C. § 7217(d)(3). 
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procedures, the firm, along with Free Enterprise Fund, a nonprofit 
organization, sued the Board and challenged its constitutionality.  The two 
organizations (petitioners) argued that the Act was unconstitutional because 
it violated the Appointments Clause and separation-of-powers principles.  
The parties stipulated that the SEC Commissioners could be removed from 
office only under the Humphrey’s Executor standard of “inefficiency, 
neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.”30  The Court emphasized that it 
decides the case “with that understanding.”31  Moreover, none of the parties 
asked the Court to reexamine Humphrey’s Executor or the constitutionality 
of the SEC’s independence.32  Accordingly, the central question in the case 
was whether the for-cause limitation on the removal of Board members by 
the Commission was constitutional.  In particular, petitioners argued that 
the Act violated separation of powers by insulating the PCAOB from 
presidential oversight, control, and supervision.33
Moreover, petitioners contended that the Act violated the Appointments 
Clause because Board members are principal officers who must be 
appointed by the President with the Advice and Consent of the Senate.
 
34  
Even if the Board members were treated as inferior officers, Article II 
requires their appointment be vested in the “Head” of a “Department,” not 
by the majority of Commissioners.35  Petitioners argued that independent 
agencies are not Departments and that the Head of the SEC is its 
Chairman.36  As a remedy, they sought a declaratory judgment that the 
Board is unconstitutional and an injunction enjoining further operations of 
the Board.  The district court rejected these arguments on the merits and 
held that the Act was constitutional.37  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia affirmed,38 with Judge Brett Kavanaugh dissenting.39
In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court reversed in part the Court of 
Appeals and held that “the dual for-cause limitations on the removal of 




 30. Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3148–49.  For an interesting discussion of this aspect 
of the case see Gary Lawson, Stipulating the Law, 109 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1677014 (arguing contrary to standard American 
practice that parties should be able to stipulate legal conclusions). 
  
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Roberts focused on the issue of first 
impression presented by the particular structure of the Board, in which its 
    31.  Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3149.   
    32.  Id. at 3147 (“The parties do not ask us to reexamine any of these precedents, and we 
do not do so.”). 
 33. Brief for Petitioners at *7–8, Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight 
Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010) (No. 08-861), 2009 WL 2247130 at *7–8. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. at *8. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., No. 06-0217, 2007 WL 
891675, at *4, *6 (D.D.C. Mar. 21, 2007). 
 38. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 537 F.3d 667, 715 (D.C. 
Cir. 2008). 
 39. Id. at 685 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). 
 40. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3151 
(2010). 
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members are protected by two levels of for-cause removal.  In the Court’s 
precedents, “only one level of protected tenure separated the President from 
an officer exercising executive power.  It was the President—or a 
subordinate he could remove at will—who decided whether the officer’s 
conduct merited removal under the good-cause standard.”41  As the Court 
explained, Board members may be removed only for good cause and the 
determination over whether good cause exists is vested with the SEC 
Commissioners, who may only be removed for cause.  “The result is a 
Board that is not accountable to the President, and a President who is not 
responsible for the Board.”42
As a remedy, the Court held that the for-cause removal protections for 
the Board could be severed from the Act.  The Board could continue with 
its duties, but would be subject to at-will removal by the Commissioners.
  The Court held that the second layer of 
protection makes a constitutional difference; two layers of for-cause 
protection contravened the constitutional structure of separation of powers 
and the vesting of executive power in the President. 
43
Justice Stephen Breyer dissented, joined by Justices John Paul Stevens, 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Sonia Sotomayor, arguing that the second layer 
of removal protection “does not significantly interfere with the President’s 
‘executive Power,’” and “violates no separation-of-powers principle.”
  
The Court explicitly rejected the petitioners’ other claims.  It held that the 
Board’s appointment was consistent with the Appointments Clause because 
appointment was vested in the Head of a Department, here the 
Commissioners of the SEC.  The Court rejected the arguments that the 
Commission is not a Department, or that the Head must be the Chairman of 
the Commission.  Because it determined that the for-cause provisions could 
be severed, the Court declined to issue the broader declaratory and 
injunctive relief sought by petitioners that would have enjoined the 
operation of the Board. 
44  
Justice Breyer noted that no text, history, or precedent fully answered the 
question about the constitutionality of two layers of for-cause removal.45  
Accordingly, the dissent’s functional analysis focused on how the Board 
operated and the type of practical control exercised by the Commission.  
Justice Breyer explained how the Commission exerted substantial control 
over Board activities and why the independence of Board members served 
important institutional purposes.  Moreover, the dissent criticized the 
Court’s decision for being “both imprecise and overly broad.”46  Justice 
Breyer argued that the majority’s opinion did not distinguish two layers of 
for-cause protection from one layer,47 and that its decision might affect 
hundreds, even thousands of high-level government officials.48
 
 41. Id. at 3153. 
 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at 3161–62. 
 44. Id. at 3164 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 45. Id. at 3167. 
 46. Id. at 3184. 
 47. Id. at 3171. 
 48. Id. at 3178–80. 
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B.  The Reaction 
Free Enterprise Fund drew a lot of attention when the Court granted 
certiorari and there was much anticipation about the outcome largely for 
two reasons.  First, the Board regulated a key part of the economy and 
controlled the fate of accounting firms nationwide.  As a practical matter, 
dismantling the Board and its work might have had significant 
consequences for the financial industry and for Congress’ attempts at 
reform.  Second, from a theoretical perspective, the decision was 
anticipated for what it might say with regard to the President’s appointment 
and removal powers and separation of powers generally—would the Court 
overrule Morrison v. Olson?49
As it turned out, the Court’s decision ultimately generated few headlines.  
Commentators almost uniformly found the decision to be of limited 
significance, both on a practical level with regard to the operation of the 
Board, and on a theoretical level with regard to the constitutionality of the 
independent agencies.  As to the effect on financial industry regulation, the 
Board could continue with its statutory duties because the Court’s remedy 
only severed the removal protection of the Board, but otherwise left the 
Board intact.  The decision left Commissioners free to remove Board 
members at will, but most commentators familiar with the workings of the 
SEC thought the decision would have little impact on the Board.  Rick 
Pildes, who filed a brief on behalf of seven former SEC Chairmen, argued 
that the victory was “symbolic.”  He noted that the decision “has no 
practical effect at all on the Sarbanes-Oxley Act; the SEC and the Board 
that administers the Act will go on as before.”
  Would it enjoin the Board because it was 
constituted in contravention of the Appointments Clause? 
50  Professor Pildes also 
argued “the decision will change nothing in the on-the-ground relationship 
between the SEC and the Board.”51
David Zaring suggested that the Court “handed petitioners a pretty empty 
declaratory victory” and although the remedy was “unconventional,” “it 
ma[de] this decision much less dramatic than it threatened to be.”
 
52 
Similarly, John Elwood argued that the opinion “won’t have much 
immediate effect outside of the PCAOB” and that a ruling on other grounds 
would have been “far more disruptive.”53
 
 49. 487 U.S. 654 (1988). 
  Others expressed disappointment 
that the Court did not go further toward invalidating the independent 
agencies, arguing that Chief Justice Roberts “slapped a bandaid on a gaping 
 50. Rick Pildes, The Free Enterprise Decision:  A Symbolic Victory for the “Unitary 
Executive Branch” Vision of the Presidency, but of Limited Practical Consequence, 
BALKINIZATION (June 28, 2010, 11:47 AM), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2010/06/free-
enterprise-decision-symbolic.html. 
 51. Id. 
 52. David Zaring, Goodbye, Old PCAOB, and Hello, New PCAOB, THE 
CONGLOMERATE, http://www.theconglomerate.org/2010/06/goodbye-old-pcaob-and-hello-
new-pcaob.html (June 28, 2010). 
 53. John Elwood, Free Enterprise Fund:  The Lopez of Separation of Powers Doctrine, 
VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (June 28, 2010, 12:31 PM), http://volokh.com/2010/06/28/free-
enterprise-fund-the-lopez-of-separation-of-powers-doctrine. 
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canyon in the Constitution.  The decision is wholly unpersuasive.”54
In the ensuing months, scholars have examined the decision more closely 
and focused on particular aspects of the Court’s reasoning, but by and large, 
have concluded that the decision has limited significance for separation of 
powers and the constitutionality of independent agencies.  For instance, 
Professor Pildes acknowledged that it is the “most expansive vision of 
presidential power over the structure of administrative agencies in perhaps 
ninety years” but maintained that the “implications of Free Enterprise Fund 
for the more general struggle between Congress and the president over 
administration remain obscure because the case presented such an 
idiosyncratic context.”
  In the 
initial aftermath of the decision, the widespread conclusion was that the 
decision would have a marginal impact on the President’s authority, little 
effect on the Board’s operations, and no consequence for the independent 
agencies generally. 
55  Peter Strauss has noted that the case was “hardly 
earthshaking” and that the implication of the decision was to “reaffirm the 
result in Humphrey’s Executor” because it recognizes that “Congress can 
create elements of the executive branch whose heads are removable only 
‘for cause.’”56  Sustaining the PCAOB on this rationale required the Court 
to accept the constitutionality of the single for-cause protection of the SEC, 
and therefore reaffirmed the constitutionality of independent agencies.57  
Similarly, Jack Beermann argued, “the Court did not deliver on the opening 
paragraph’s promise of a major reform in the law of separation of powers” 
and that to the extent the decision was viewed as a milestone “it is more 
likely to be understood as the acceptance of independent agencies by a 
conservative Court that may have been expected to move things in a 
different direction.”58
II.  A PROOF FOR THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE PCAOB 
  As the next part explains, this Article challenges 
these common perceptions.   
Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion for the Court sets out a number of very 
broad principles about separation of powers and the importance of vesting 
the executive power in a single President.  These principles cast doubt on 
the constitutionality of agency independence more generally.  The opinion 
 
 54. Stephen M. Bainbridge, The PCAOB Anti-climax, PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM (June 
28, 2010, 9:38 AM) http://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/
2010/06/the-pcaob-anticlimax.html. 
 55. Richard H. Pildes, Free Enterprise Fund, Boundary—Enforcing Decisions, and the 
Unitary Executive Branch Theory of Government Administration, 6 DUKE J. CONST. L. & 
PUB. POL’Y (forthcoming), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1678031. 
 56. Peter L. Strauss, On the Difficulties of Generalization—PCAOB in the Footsteps of 
Myers, Humphrey’s Executor, Morrison, and Freytag 17, 19 (Colum L. Sch. Pub. L. & Legal 
Theory Working Paper Grp., Working Paper No. 10–253, 2010), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1693143.  
 57. Id. at 19. 
 58. Jack Michael Beermann, An Inductive Understanding of Separation of Powers or 
Why the PCAOB Opinion Doesn’t Change Anything Yet 3–4 (Boston Univ. Sch. of L., 
Working Paper No. 10–24, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1656452. 
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notes the “modesty” of the question proposed,59
In the course of answering the modest question about the Board, the 
decision provides the reasoning for undermining Humphrey’s Executor and 
the constitutionality of agency independence.  Is the Court inclined to 
overrule its precedents to invalidate agency independence?  There are some 
reasons to think that it has created an opening for such a challenge, as 
discussed below.
 but then answers that 
question with principles that form a proof, one that seems suited not so 
much to the unusual facts of this case, but rather to independent agencies 
more broadly.  Moreover, the Court uses a severance remedy that can easily 
be applied to independent agencies because it allows an agency to continue 
with its duties, subject to the possibility of at will removal by the President.   
60
This part explains the Court’s proof in greater detail and demonstrates 
how the opinion’s reasoning sets the foundation for challenging the 
constitutionality of agency independence.  Admittedly, the Chief Justice’s 
opinion does not proceed precisely in the form identified in this part; such a 
clear roadmap of the broader implications might run against claims to 
judicial modesty.  Yet the principles about the structure of the Constitution, 
the vesting of the executive power in the President, the need for political 
accountability in the executive branch, and the constitutional imperative of 
the removal power form a type of proof that highlights the central logic of 
the opinion, which is that a statute cannot diminish or eliminate the 
President’s power to oversee and remove executive officers. 
  Although there are the usual difficulties with predicting 
where the Court will go next, the logic of Free Enterprise Fund has the 
potential to disrupt agency independence across the board.  
A.  Faithful Execution of the Laws Requires Presidential Oversight 
The Court’s major premise is that separation of powers requires the 
President to oversee and to control executive branch officials in order to 
ensure faithful execution of the laws. 
In Free Enterprise Fund, the Court begins with separation of powers:  
“Our Constitution divided the powers of the new Federal Government into 
three defined categories, Legislative, Executive, and Judicial.”61  Article II 
vests the executive power in the President who must take care that the laws 
be faithfully executed.62  Executive officers help the President with his 
duties and the Constitution empowers the President to “keep these officers 
accountable—by removing them from office, if necessary.”63
 
 59. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3157 
(2010) (“The point is not to take issue with for-cause limitations in general; we do not do 
that.  The question here is far more modest.”). 
  The President 
must oversee executive officers, because “if any power whatsoever is in its 
    60.    See infra Part IV.A. 
    61.  Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3146 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
    62.  U.S. Const. art II, § 1, § 3;  Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3146. 
    63.  Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3146.  
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nature Executive, it is the power of appointing, overseeing, and controlling 
those who execute the laws.”64
To support this principle, the Chief Justice appeals to the “landmark 
case” of Myers v. United States,
   
65 which recognized that the President has 
“general administrative control of those executing the laws.”66
The Court links control of the executive branch with the ability to 
oversee the work of its officers.  “Without the ability to oversee the Board, 
or to attribute the Board’s failings to those whom he can oversee, the 
President is no longer the judge of the Board’s conduct.”
 Myers is 
often considered to be the high-water mark of the unitary executive theory, 
because the lengthy decision emphasizes the constitutional imperative of 
the President’s exclusive and unhampered removal power.  Invoking Myers 
at the outset indicates the direction of the Court’s opinion.  The Court does 
not frequently cite Myers, but follows its general principles throughout. 
67
The Court explains that the President’s responsibility for overseeing and 
controlling executive branch officials stems in part from the constitutional 
obligation to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”
  The President 
can judge the Board’s conduct only if he can oversee its activities.  Here, 
the Court expresses this idea in the context of the double layer of for-cause 
removal, but the principle stresses the general importance of presidential 
oversight of executive officers. 
68  The 
President’s inability to oversee the Board means that “[h]e can neither 
ensure that the laws are faithfully executed, nor be held responsible for a 
Board member’s breach of faith.”69  The judgment of what constitutes 
“faithful execution” of the laws rests with the President under Article II.  
Accordingly, the President must be able to set the standard for determining 
whether his subordinates are properly executing their duties.70  If the 
President is to be held accountable to the people for faithful execution, he 
must be able to oversee the work of executive branch officials and such 
oversight must be left to his discretion.71
Moreover, the Court explains that presidential oversight and control of 
executive branch officials has an important structural purpose—it plays an 
integral part in the scheme of separation of powers between the President 
and Congress.  The President’s appointment, oversight, and control of those 
who execute the laws are “key constitutional means” for the executive to 
 
 
 64. Id. at 3151 (1 ANNALS OF CONG. 463 (1789) (statement of James Madison)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
    65.  272 U.S. 52 (1926). 
 66. Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3152 (quoting Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. at 
164) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 67. Id. at 3154. 
 68. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3; see also Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3147 (“The 
President cannot ‘take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed’ if he cannot oversee the 
faithfulness of the officers who execute them.”). 
 69. Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3154. 
 70. As the next part of the proof explains, oversight of subordinates requires being able 
to remove them at will. See infra Part II.B. 
 71. As the third step of the proof explains, this argument leads the Court to the principle 
that the removal power cannot be limited by statute.  See infra Part II.C. 
2552 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79 
resist the encroachments of the other branches.72  The Court considers the 
appointment and oversight of executive officials to be one of the structural 
protections of the Constitution that, in the words of James Madison, allows 
ambition to counteract ambition by “giving each branch ‘the necessary 
constitutional means, and personal motives, to resist encroachments of the 
others.’”73
Without presidential oversight, Congress could assume a 
disproportionate power over the administrative state.  As the Court 
explains, “Congress has plenary control over the salary, duties, and even 
existence of executive offices.  Only presidential oversight can counter its 
influence.”
   
74  Vesting responsibility for executive officers with the 
President empowers him to resist legislative encroachments.  In addition, it 
matches responsibility for faithful execution with control over executive 
branch officials.75
For this responsibility to be efficacious, the responsibility must 
ultimately belong to the President alone:  “It is his responsibility to take 
care that the laws be faithfully executed.  The buck stops with the President, 
in Harry Truman’s famous phrase.”
 
76  The Chief Justice does not use the 
contentious term “unitary executive,” but instead cites an opinion by Justice 
Stephen Breyer for the proposition that the President “‘cannot delegate 
ultimate responsibility or the active obligation to supervise that goes with 
it,’ because Article II ‘makes a single President responsible for the actions 
of the Executive Branch.’”77
Chief Justice Roberts explains that the unitary nature of presidential 
control is necessary to self-government: 
  The singular, centralized nature of the 
President’s authority is a key feature of the structure of accountability 
within the executive branch. 
 Our Constitution was adopted to enable the people to govern 
themselves, through their elected leaders.  The growth of the Executive 
Branch, which now wields vast power and touches almost every aspect of 
 
 72. Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3157 (quoting 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 463 (1789)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 73. Id. at 3157 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison)). 
 74. Id. at 3156. 
 75. Similarly, in Myers the Court explained that the constitutional structure could not 
have given Congress or the Senate 
in case of political or other differences, the means of thwarting the Executive in 
the exercise of his great powers and in the bearing of his great responsibility, by 
fastening upon him, as subordinate executive officers, men who by their inefficient 
service . . . [or] by their lack of loyalty to the service, or by their different views of 
policy, might make his taking care that the laws be faithfully executed most 
difficult or impossible. 
Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 131 (1926). Myers noted that the President’s exercise of 
his great powers requires subordinates who are efficient, loyal, and share the President’s 
view of policy. Id.  The President’s responsibilities require that he oversee whether his 
subordinates meet these and other criteria that he might set out for their service in his 
Administration.  Id. 
 76. Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3152. 
 77. Id. at 3154 (emphasis added) (quoting Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 712–13 
(1997) (Breyer, J., concurring)). 
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daily life, heightens the concerns that it may slip from the Executive’s 
control, and thus from that of the people.78
It follows from the President’s constitutional responsibility that resting 
important executive powers beyond the control of the President undermines 
democratic accountability.  “The diffusion of power carries with it a 
diffusion of accountability.”
 
79  Within the executive branch, the President is 
the only democratically elected official and the political accountability of 
his subordinates depends on their accountability to the President.80  The 
Court acknowledges that Congress has the power to create a vast federal 
bureaucracy, but the “Constitution requires that a President chosen by the 
entire Nation oversee the execution of the laws.”81
The Court establishes this central principle:  vested with the executive 
power, the President must oversee executive officers as part of his 
obligation for faithful execution of the laws and to ensure political 
accountability for the work of the executive branch.  This principle serves 
as the major premise of the Court’s proof. 
  
B.  Presidential Oversight Requires the Capacity to Remove Subordinate 
Officers 
The Court begins with the premise that the structure of our constitutional 
democracy requires that the President oversee the work of his subordinates 
and ensure they are faithfully executing the laws.  The first principle is 
relatively uncontroversial, as the need for presidential supervision of the 
executive branch is widely acknowledged.82
The Court answers some of these questions in its second premise:  
presidential oversight requires the President have the ability to remove 
executive branch officials.  Effective oversight and control require the 
ability to remove officials who fail to properly execute the laws.  As Chief 
Justice Roberts explains, debates during the founding era suggested that 
“the executive power included a power to oversee executive officers 
through removal; because that traditional executive power was not 
‘expressly taken away, it remained with the President.’”
  The difficult questions pertain 
to how the President exercises supervision and to what degree Congress can 
restrict the President’s ability to supervise. 
83
 
 78. Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3156. 
  By contrast, 
Justice Breyer does not argue against the importance of presidential 
 79. Id. at 3155. 
 80. Id. (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 72 (Alexander Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed., 1961)). 
 81. Id. at 3155–56. 
 82. See, e.g., Strauss, supra note 56, at 20 (“[T]he question is not whether [the President] 
is entitled to command or decide, but what constitutes the constitutionally indispensable 
elements of his necessary oversight relationship.”). 
 83. Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3151–52 (emphasis added) (quoting letter from 
James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (June 30, 1789), in 16 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE 
FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS 893 (2004)). 
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oversight, but instead maintains that such oversight may be provided by 
means other than the removal power.84
At various points in the opinion, the Court suggests that these two 
principles—presidential oversight and the removal power—are inextricably 
linked.  This is the strongest form of the argument with regard to the unitary 
executive and the unconstitutionality of the independent agencies, and is the 
principle at the heart of Myers.
 
85  The Court expounds on how the removal 
power is one of the key constitutional means of presidential control over the 
executive branch.  The President cannot fulfill his responsibilities through 
mere persuasion.  As Chief Justice Roberts emphasizes, “Congress cannot 
reduce the Chief Magistrate to a cajoler-in-chief.”86
The accountability of the President for the faithful execution of the laws 
requires that he have the power to secure execution in the manner he sees 
fit:  “That power includes, as a general matter, the authority to remove those 
who assist him in carrying out his duties.  Without such power, the 
President could not be held fully accountable for discharging his own 
responsibilities; the buck would stop somewhere else.”
 
87  This argument 
proceeds on the structural understanding that oversight requires the means 
of controlling subordinates and that ultimate control requires the removal 
power.  Without the ability to direct and control backed up by the removal 
power, executive authority dissipates and this undermines the responsibility 
of the President for the actions of the executive branch.  The natural 
implication of the constitutional structure is that the President retains the 
full removal power, a point also discussed in Myers.88
By contrast, the dissent defends the Act by highlighting the virtues of 
bureaucratic independence.  Statutes give the heads of independent agencies 
tenure protection precisely to limit the President’s oversight and political 
control.  Justice Breyer expresses the standard interests served by for-cause 
removal provisions, including that they protect the independence of 




 84. Id. at 3170 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (evaluating the extent to which the removal 
provision “as a practical matter” limits the “President’s exercise of executive authority”). 
  With regard to 
the independent agencies, such goals are thought to be in conflict with 
direct presidential oversight.  Independent agencies are created in part to 
remove certain functions from the President’s “political” influence. 
 85. See generally Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 122 (1926) (explaining in great 
historical detail why the removal power necessarily follows from the President’s control of 
the executive branch). 
 86. Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3157. 
 87. Id. at 3164. 
 88. Myers drew this connection between faithful execution of the laws and the power to 
appoint and remove executive officers.  As Chief Justice William Howard Taft explained, 
The power of removal is incident to the power of appointment, not to the power of 
advising and consenting to appointment, and when the grant of the executive 
power is enforced by the express mandate to take care that the laws be faithfully 
executed, it emphasizes the necessity for including within the executive power as 
conferred the exclusive power of removal. 
Myers, 272 U.S. at 122. 
 89. Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3174 (Breyer, J. dissenting). 
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Justice Breyer would also uphold independence of the Board and its 
double insulation from presidential removal on the ground that the statutory 
oversight provided by the Commission is constitutionally sufficient.  He 
explains that although Board members may be removed only for cause, in 
reality the statute gives the Commission very broad control over the Board 
and such functional control renders the Board constitutional.  The statutory 
scheme includes various means of control, including that the Commission 
(1) must approve Board rules, (2) may review and alter Board rules, (3) 
may review and alter Board sanctions, and (4) may promulgate rules 
restricting the Board’s conduct of inspections and investigations.90  
Moreover, the Commission controls the Board’s budget and can assign the 
Board any duties or functions that it deems appropriate.91
Justice Breyer argues that these provisions effectively give the 
Commission a significant degree of control over the Board even without at-
will removal:  “And if the President’s control over the Commission is 
sufficient, and the Commission’s control over the Board is virtually 
absolute, then, as a practical matter, the President’s control over the Board 
should prove sufficient as well.”
 
92  From the dissent’s perspective, the 
limitations on the Commissioners’ removal power have little significance 
because of the Commissioners’ “authority and virtually comprehensive 
control over all of the Board’s functions.”93
Chief Justice Roberts responds to the dissent by defending the 
importance of the removal power on both functional and constitutional 
grounds.  First, he argues that functional means of control cannot replace 
the removal power.  Although the Commission may hold the Board 
accountable by approving its budget or overseeing its rules and sanctions, 
these means of control are “not equivalent to the power to remove Board 
members.”
  In sum, functional control can 
substitute for removal and provide a constitutionally sufficient method of 
oversight. 
94  As a practical matter, control over the Board’s budget or 
sanctions “is a problematic way to control an inferior officer.  The 
Commission cannot wield a free hand to supervise individual members if it 
must destroy the Board in order to fix it.”95
 
 90. Id. at 3172. 
  The Court stresses that removal 
is a targeted and specific method of oversight that allows the President to 
dismiss an executive officer who fails to serve the goals and policies of the 
President.  Chief Justice Roberts argues that removal is a better and more 
precise means of control.  Other methods, such as cutting the Board’s 
budget or enacting rules to govern the Board’s procedures, work like a 
sledgehammer when a scalpel is more effective.  The President should not 
have to hobble a government agency because he cannot dismiss an 
ineffective or disloyal officer. 
 91. Id. at 3173 (citing statutory provisions). 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 3172. 
 94. Id. at 3158 (majority opinion). 
 95. Id. at 3158–59. 
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The Chief Justice’s argument, however, goes beyond a disagreement 
about whether removal is functionally superior.  Rather, removal is the 
constitutionally required means of oversight, particularly because the Board 
exercises significant executive power outside of the effective control of the 
Commission.96
C.  Congress Cannot Limit the President’s Removal Power 
  The Court rejects the idea that pragmatic or functional 
limitations can be, as Justice Breyer says, “sufficient,” because they do not 
serve the same purpose as removal—a distinct means of oversight related to 
the executive power and executive duty of faithful execution.  Accordingly, 
the constitutional structure of separation of powers requires presidential 
oversight of executive officers and such oversight requires the ability to 
remove these officers at will. 
Faithful execution of the laws requires presidential oversight of executive 
officials.  Moreover, such oversight requires, as a general rule, the ability to 
remove officials when they fail to perform to the President’s standards.  
These first two fundamental principles lead to the next question about the 
extent to which Congress has the authority to restrict the President’s 
removal authority.  This is precisely the question at issue in the case:  
“whether Congress may deprive the President of adequate control over the 
Board, which is the regulator of first resort and the primary law 
enforcement authority for a vital sector of our economy.”97  The Court 
holds that Congress cannot deprive the President of such “adequate 
control.”98
This question, however, is not entirely straightforward.  The Constitution 
provides for the appointment of principal and inferior officers, but is silent 
with respect to their removal.
 
99  Since Humphrey’s Executor, the Court has 
held that Congress may limit the President’s authority to remove officials 
within independent agencies.100  Moreover, the Court has also upheld 
restrictions on principal officers to remove their inferiors, because the 
principal officers remain ultimately responsible to the President.101  The 
Court puts aside consideration of these cases and notes that their validity is 
not at issue in this case.102
 
 96. Id. at 3159 (“[T]he Act nowhere gives the Commission effective power to start, stop, 
or alter individual Board investigations, executive activities typically carried out by officials 
within the Executive Branch.”). 
  The specific question about the constitutionality 
of two levels of for-cause removal is one of first impression.  With regard to 
 97. Id. at 3161. 
 98.  Id. 
 99. See id. at 3167 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[T]he question presented lies at the 
intersection of two sets of conflicting, broadly framed constitutional principles.  And no text, 
no history, perhaps no precedent provides any clear answer.”); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 
654, 697 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 100. See Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 631–32 (1935). 
 101. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 672; United States v. Perkins, 116 U.S. 483, 485 (1886). 
 102. The parties stipulated that SEC members could be removed only for cause, and they 
did not challenge the validity of Humphrey’s Executor. Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3148. 
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this new arrangement, the Court holds that the removal power can be 
diluted no further.  Two levels is too many. 
Nonetheless, in reaching this conclusion about the Board, the Chief 
Justice sets out the general principle that Congress cannot limit the 
President’s removal power, because such power is constitutionally vested in 
the President.  “Congress has plenary control over the salary, duties, and 
even existence of executive offices.  Only Presidential oversight can 
counter its influence.  That is why the Constitution vests certain powers in 
the President that ‘the Legislature has no right to diminish or modify.’”103  
Presidential oversight is an essential counterbalance to Congress and the 
removal power is essential to make such oversight effective.104
The generality of the Court’s principle—that the President must retain 
the full removal power—is reflected in the statements quoted above, but 
also in the opinion’s fourth footnote, which provides a key step in the 
Court’s reasoning.
  The vesting 
of the executive power with the President means that Congress cannot 
“diminish or modify” the President’s powers, including the power to 
remove executive officers.  Although the Court at points pleads restraint, its 
language goes beyond the narrow question of the Board’s unusual two 
layers of insulation from presidential control, and instead sets forth the 
constitutional principle that Congress cannot diminish or modify the 
President’s removal power because of the constitutional structure of 
separation of powers and the vesting of the executive power in the 
President. 
105  The Court explains that the double layer of for-cause 
protection is problematic when the President wants to remove a Board 
member whom the Commission wants to retain.  “With the second layer in 
place, the Commission can shield its decision from Presidential review by 
finding that good cause is absent—a finding that, given the Commission’s 
own protected tenure, the President cannot easily overturn.”106  Chief 
Justice Roberts argues that this is not just a possible scenario.  Rather, “it is 
the central issue in this case:  The second layer matters precisely when the 
President finds it necessary to have a subordinate officer removed, and a 
statute prevents him from doing so.”107
The Court concludes that a statute cannot prevent the President from 
removing a subordinate officer when he finds it necessary, because the 
President must have sole authority to determine necessity for removal.  The 
removal power is a constitutional one and cannot be hampered by for-cause 
   
 
 103. Id. at 3156 (quoting 1 ANNALS OF CONG. at 463 (1789) (statement of James 
Madison)). 
 104. Id. at 3157. 
 105. Id. at 3154 n.4.  Cf. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 
(1938); J.M. Balkin, The Footnote, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 275, 281 (1989) (“When 
constitutional scholars talk about the ‘problem of the footnote,’ they are referring to a 
specific footnote, the Footnote, footnote four of United States v. Carolene Products . . . . 
Here indeed is a footnote that has become more important than the text; that is often read 
separated from its text; that can stand alone.”). 
 106. Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3154 n.4.   
 107. Id. 
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limitations.  The Court applies this principle to the double layer at issue in 
this case, but the Court’s reasoning is not limited to the double layer.   
The Court’s remedy—severing the Board’s for-cause removal 
protections—reinforces the constitutional mandate of the removal power.  
The Court explains that for-cause removal in the Act is only one of a 
number of provisions that together create the constitutional violation, and 
Congress remains free to pursue other alterations to the statute.  But the 
Court suggests that any such alteration must allow the President to oversee 
and to control officials conducting core executive functions.  Congress 
could “limit the Board’s responsibilities so that its members would no 
longer be ‘Officers of the United States,’” or the Board’s enforcement 
powers might be limited so it becomes purely recommendatory.108
Thus, the Court maintains that the President’s power to remove 
subordinate officers at will is a constitutional one that cannot be diminished 
or modified by statute. 
  The 
alternatives suggested by the Court, however, make clear that Congress 
cannot create independence from presidential oversight, control, and 
removal for a Board that executes core executive branch functions.  This 
remains true even if Congress does not aggregate power to itself and even if 
the President wishes to tie his hands with such provisions. 
D.  QED:  Tenure Protections for the Board are Unconstitutional 
The Court sets out three broad principles:  (1) faithful execution of the 
laws requires presidential oversight, (2) this oversight includes the power to 
remove executive branch officials, and (3) the removal power is a 
constitutional one that cannot be diminished or eliminated by statute.  The 
Court draws from these broad principles the narrow conclusion that the 
Board’s two layers of for-cause tenure are unconstitutional.  This “new type 
of restriction—two levels of protection from removal for those who 
nonetheless exercise significant executive power” does not follow from the 
Court’s precedents.109  The Court explains:  “We deal with the unusual 
situation, never before addressed by the Court, of two layers of for-cause 
tenure.  And though it may be criticized as ‘elementary arithmetical logic,’ 
two layers are not the same as one.”110  The Court concludes, “Congress 
cannot limit the President’s authority in this way.”111
The Court emphasizes the novel, second level of tenure protection as its 
reason for holding the Board’s independence unconstitutional.  The Court 
holds that Board officials exercising executive power must have 
presidential oversight because such oversight ensures faithful execution and 
allows the public to hold the President politically responsible for the actions 
of the executive branch:  “By granting the Board executive power without 
the Executive’s oversight, this Act subverts the President’s ability to ensure 
 
 
 108. Id. at 3162. 
 109. Id. at 3164. 
 110. Id. at 3157 (citation omitted). 
 111. Id. at 3164. 
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that the laws are faithfully executed—as well as the public’s ability to pass 
judgment on his efforts.”112  Article II vests the executive power in the 
President and the Court stresses that the President is singularly responsible 
for the actions of the executive branch.  Accordingly, he cannot delegate 
this ultimate responsibility or the obligation to supervise that goes with 
it.113
After the lofty discussion about the importance of presidential oversight 
of executive officials, however, the Court provides a more pedestrian 
remedy to the constitutional problem.  Severing the for-cause tenure 
protection simply allows the Commission to remove Board members at 
will—it does not bring Board members under the direct oversight of the 
President.  The Board remains insulated from presidential control by the 
for-cause limits protecting the Commissioners.  The Commissioners can 
remove Board members at will, but because of the Commissioners’ 
protected tenure, the President’s control over the Board continues to be 
attenuated.
  The Court makes clear that the Constitution requires presidential 
oversight and that such oversight requires unimpaired removal power by the 
President.  The for-cause protections for the Board are unconstitutional 
because they disrupt the chain of accountability between the President and 
executive branch officials beyond the Court’s existing precedents. 
114
The Court’s proof establishes both more and less than what it needs to 
justify its remedy.  It establishes too much with the first three steps of the 
proof that would naturally lead to the conclusion that the Board requires 
direct presidential oversight.  It establishes too little when it fails to explain 
why oversight by the SEC, an independent agency, is a constitutionally 
sufficient means for the President to exercise control of the Board.  As the 
next part demonstrates, however, a proof ill-suited to the Board nonetheless 
applies logically and perhaps more naturally to the traditional independent 
agencies. 
 
III.  CHALLENGING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF FIRST-LEVEL AGENCY 
INDEPENDENCE 
Despite claims to minimalism by the Court, Free Enterprise Fund 
logically implicates the constitutionality of agency independence.  The 
breadth of the proof and the narrowness of the remedy are not well suited to 
the unusual and limited question about the constitutionality of the Board’s 
two levels of tenure protection.  The proof and the remedy, however, create 
a framework for challenging the constitutionality of the independent 
agencies more generally.  By emphasizing the importance of presidential 
control and accountability through the removal power, the Court calls into 
question the constitutionality of the ordinary first layer of agency 
independence.  Moreover, severing for-cause removal provisions provides a 
 
 112. Id. at 3155. 
 113. Id. at 3154. 
 114. Justice Breyer identifies this central aspect of the majority’s opinion. Id. at 3171 
(Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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workable remedy for eliminating agency independence without eliminating 
the independent agencies. 
Admittedly, Free Enterprise Fund does not directly challenge the 
constitutionality of the SEC or other independent agencies, because these 
questions were not presented to the Court.  The parties stipulated that 
Commissioners could be removed only under the Humphrey’s Executor 
standard of “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.”115  
Moreover, no party challenged the constitutionality of the SEC’s 
independence or asked the Court to reexamine Humphrey’s Executor.116  
Accordingly, the Court does not revisit its precedents, nor does it 
specifically reaffirm them.117  The Court, however, suggests some 
receptivity to a future challenge when it emphasizes that the President’s 
removal power follows from the constitutional structure, whereas 
limitations on the removal power rest only on the Court’s precedents.118
A.  Applying the Proof to One Level of Agency Independence 
  
Furthermore, the logic of the Chief Justice’s opinion calls into question the 
constitutionality of one layer of removal protections.  As this part 
demonstrates, the Court’s framework could be used to challenge agency 
independence and possibly revisit Humphrey’s Executor. 
The principles and proof that lead the Court to conclude that the Board’s 
two layers of tenure protections are unconstitutional logically apply to most 
for-cause restrictions on the President’s removal power, such as those 
insulating the independent agencies from presidential oversight.  This 
logical application, of course, runs headlong into the Court’s precedents.  
Whether the Court would in fact reconsider its precedents remains to be 
seen, but Free Enterprise Fund holds out this possibility.119
The Court’s first premise is that faithful execution of the laws requires 
presidential oversight.  This general principle follows from the separation of 
powers, the vesting of executive power in the President, and the need for 
democratic accountability in the executive branch.  Although the Court at 
times focuses on the Board’s two layers of for-cause removal, it also casts 
doubt on whether one layer is constitutional.  For example, the Chief Justice 
repeatedly highlights that the President can hold the Commissioners 
accountable only in an attenuated way because they can be removed only 
for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office:  “Neither the 
President, nor anyone directly responsible to him, nor even an officer whose 
 
 
 115. Id. at 3148 (majority opinion) (quoting Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 
U.S. 602, 620 (1935)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
   116.  Id. at 3147. 
 117. Cf. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (holding that the Gun Free School 
Zone Act of 1990 exceeds Congress’s Commerce Clause authority, but reaffirming far-
reaching Commerce Clause precedents such as Wickard v. Filburn). 
 118. Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3146 (“Since 1789, the Constitution has been 
understood to empower the President to keep [executive] officers accountable—by removing 
them from office, if necessary.  This Court has determined, however, that this authority is 
not without limit.”) (emphasis added) (citing Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926)). 
   119.  See infra Part IV.A. 
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conduct he may review only for good cause, has full control over the 
Board.”120  The Chief Justice emphasizes the language of fullness—
somebody must be “fully accountable” for the Board’s conduct, must have 
“full control over the Board.”121
Moreover, contrary to the reading of other commentators,
   
122 the Court’s 
holding does not require reaffirming the constitutionality of the first layer.  
In fact, throughout the opinion the Court casts doubt on the constitutionality 
of the limited control that the President has over the Commission.  For 
example, after emphasizing the importance of full or direct control over 
executive officers, the Court notes that the President lacks “direct control” 
of the Commission.123
The Court never states that the President’s control over the Commission 
is sufficient, only that it remains unchallenged in this case.  Instead, the 
Court simply repeats that without the tenure protections on the Board the 
President “could then hold the Commission to account for its supervision of 
the Board, to the same extent that he may hold the Commission to account 
for everything else it does.”
  The Court treats full control as the constitutional 
standard, but stresses that the President has less than full control of the 
Commission.  Under existing precedents and the parties’ stipulation as to 
the independence of the Commission, the President can hold the 
Commission accountable only up to a point.   
124  The second level of tenure protection 
changes even this limited accountability because the President “cannot hold 
the Commission fully accountable for the Board’s conduct, to the same 
extent that he may hold the Commission accountable for everything else 
that it does.”125
This formulation is at best ambiguous about the constitutionality of the 
SEC’s single layer of independence from the President’s control.  Far from 
accepting the constitutionality of the first layer, it notes that accountability 
of the President over the Commission is incomplete—not full control or 
supervision, but some ill-defined quantum of accountability for all of the 
Commission’s actions.  The Court does not have to reaffirm the 
constitutionality of the Commission’s for-cause removal protection to reach 
its conclusion.  It simply holds that having a second layer of for-cause 
protection fundamentally changes the nature of the President’s removal 
power and goes beyond the accountability preserved by the Court’s 
precedents.  What this accountability comes to, or whether and in what 
circumstances it would be constitutional, is simply not addressed by the 
decision.   The logic of the opinion, however, strongly suggests that control 
over independent agencies such as the SEC is not sufficient, precisely 
 
 
 120. Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3154 (emphasis added). 
 121. Id. 
   122.  See supra notes 56–58 and accompanying text. 
 123. Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3153 (“[The] decision [regarding the Board’s 
removal] is vested instead in other tenured officers—the Commissioners—none of whom is 
subject to the President’s direct control.”). 
 124. Id. at 3154. 
 125. Id. 
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because separation of powers requires the President to have full oversight 
and control over executive branch officials. 
The lack of adequate control relates to the second premise:  presidential 
oversight requires the removal power.  Again, the constitutional importance 
of the removal power does not turn on the two layers of removal protection 
for the PCAOB.  Rather, the Court states a general principle that can extend 
to the first level of agency independence:  “The Constitution that makes the 
President accountable to the people for executing the laws also gives him 
the power to do so.  That power includes, as a general matter, the authority 
to remove those who assist him in carrying out his duties.”126
The implication for the first level is reflected in the Court’s analysis of 
the lack of “full” accountability over the Board, which does not result only 
from the second level of tenure protection as the Court sometimes 
maintains.  Rather, the constitutional infirmity arises from the combination 
of tenure protections—the President can remove Commissioners only for 
cause, and the Commissioners in turn can remove Board members only for 
cause.  The second level of tenure protections for the Board would not be 
unconstitutional but for the fact of the SEC’s independence.  If 
Commissioners could be removed at will, then the tenure protections for 
Board members would presumably be constitutional under Morrison v. 
Olson.
  If oversight 
requires control through the ability to remove, this logically applies to the 
first layer of tenure protection as well. 
127  The SEC’s independence is thus essential to the Court’s 
conclusion.  If the Commissioners’ independence—their insulation from 
removal except for specified causes—poses no constitutional difficulty, 
then why can the Board not be independent from the SEC?  The narrow and 
direct answer is that two layers of tenure protection are not the same as 
one.128
The Court’s logic, however, suggests a more substantial constitutional 
infirmity.  The unconstitutionality of the Board’s tenure protection stems 
from the independence of the SEC.  The Court holds that the second layer 
diminishes presidential control to an unacceptable degree:  “this dispersion 
of responsibility could be multiplied.  If Congress can shelter the 




   126.  Id. at 3164. 
  
The Court holds that two or more layers of for-cause tenure impermissibly 
limit the President’s authority.  The constitutionality of one layer of for-
cause protection looms large despite the Court’s protestations to the 
contrary.  If Congress cannot shelter the bureaucracy behind two layers of 
good-cause tenure, why can it shelter the bureaucracy behind one?  The 
 127. 487 U.S. 654, 692 (1988) (upholding for-cause restrictions on the Attorney 
General’s ability to remove the independent counsel because “the Executive, through the 
Attorney General, retains ample authority to assure that the counsel is competently 
performing his or her statutory responsibilities in a manner that comports with the provisions 
of the Act”). 
 128. Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3154–55. 
 129. Id. at 3154. 
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Court’s reasoning implies that the first level of independence is at least 
constitutionally attenuated.  Holding that the Board’s protections go too far 
in removing control from the President implies that the independence of the 
Commission is itself on shaky constitutional ground because it undermines 
full presidential oversight.  Whether one layer of agency independence 
impermissibly diminishes the President’s control is a question left for 
another case, but the Court lays the foundations for an affirmative answer. 
This implication is not lost on the dissenters.  Justice Breyer denounces 
the Chief Justice’s logical assault on the independent agencies.  “[I]f the 
President’s control over the Commission is sufficient, and the 
Commission’s control over the Board is virtually absolute, then, as a 
practical matter, the President’s control over the Board should prove 
sufficient as well.”130  Justice Breyer’s argument draws on two 
assumptions.  First, the President’s control over the SEC is sufficient; and 
second, the SEC’s control over the Board is virtually absolute.  The 
majority focuses its argument on the second assumption and stresses that 
the Commission’s control over the Board is not absolute, but instead leaves 
the Board with substantial independence over important executive 
functions.  The majority explains at length how the Commissioners are “not 
responsible for the Board’s actions”131
The logic of the Court’s opinion, however, repeatedly throws Justice 
Breyer’s other fundamental premise into question—i.e., that presidential 
control over the SEC is constitutionally sufficient.  The second step of the 
Court’s proof—that presidential oversight requires the unhampered removal 
power—can apply to the first layer of for-cause removal as well as to the 
second.  The Court indicates that the President’s control over the 
Commission is not sufficient because the President cannot oversee 
Commissioners or remove them at will.  For example, Chief Justice Roberts 
explains, “Without the ability to oversee the Board, or to attribute the 
Board’s failings to those whom he can oversee, the President is no longer 
the judge of the Board’s conduct.”
 and focuses on the specific 
deficiencies of the statutory scheme creating the Board. 
132  The Court finds that the President 
cannot oversee the Board, in part because the President cannot sufficiently 
oversee the Commission.  The President cannot adequately oversee the 
Commission precisely because he cannot remove Commissioners at will.133
Which brings us to the third step of the proof:  Congress cannot diminish 
or modify the President’s removal power.  As with the previous steps, the 
 
 
 130. Id. at 3173 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 131. Id. at 3154 (majority opinion); see also id. at 3158–59 (describing the statutory 
scheme and explaining the absence of meaningful control by the Commissioners). 
 132. Id. at 3154. 
 133. Justice Breyer again does not let the Court sidestep the central inquiry.  The majority 
identifies as the central problem the fact that the decision to remove Board members is 
vested in Commissioners, “none of whom is subject to the President’s direct control.” Id. at 
3171 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  Breyer explains that “nullifying the Commission’s power to 
remove Board members only for cause will not resolve the problem the Court has identified:  
The President will still be ‘powerless to intervene’ by removing the Board members if the 
Commission reasonably decides not to do so.” Id. 
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general principle follows from separation of powers and the vesting of the 
executive power in the President.  The Chief Justice’s explanation for why 
Congress cannot place a double restriction on the President’s removal 
power also implies that a single restriction is unconstitutional.  As footnote 
four explains, the central issue in the case is that “[t]he second layer matters 
precisely when the President finds it necessary to have a subordinate officer 
removed, and a statute prevents him from doing so.”134  Of course, this is 
also the central issue with regard to the constitutionality of the first layer of 
removal protection enjoyed by the heads of the independent agencies.  The 
for-cause removal limits matter “precisely when the President finds it 
necessary to have a subordinate officer removed, and a statute prevents him 
from doing so.”135
Justice Breyer makes the same observation:  “the Court fails to show why 
two layers of ‘for cause’ protection—Layer One insulating the 
Commissioners from the President, and Layer Two insulating the Board 
from the Commissioners—impose any more serious limitation upon the 
President’s powers than one layer.”
  This issue is the nub of the constitutional question for 
the first layer of removal protections as much as for the second.  The Chief 
Justice’s logic fails, perhaps by design, to distinguish between the 
constitutionality of one and two layers of for-cause removal protection. 
136  Layer One insulates the Board from 
the President’s full control in the same manner that it insulates all of the 
activities of the Commission.  The Court’s severance remedy gives the 
President only slightly more control over the Board by removing the second 
layer of protection.  The primary control over the Board goes to the 
Commissioners, who remain subject to removal by the President only for 
cause.  The President’s indirect control over the Board is enhanced by the 
decision in uncertain ways.137
If a Board member disregards presidential policy and the Commissioners 
decide not to remove the Board member, this would likely not constitute 
“good cause” for removal.
  The President can hold Commissioners 
responsible only if their failure to remove a Board member results from 
inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office. 
138  Thus, as the dissent recognizes “a removal 
restriction’s effect upon presidential power depends not on the presence of a 
‘double-layer’ of for-cause removal, as the majority pretends, but rather on 
the real-world nature of the President’s relationship with the 
Commission.”139
 
 134. Id. at 3154 n.4 (majority opinion). 
  This real-world relationship includes the fact that the 
   135.  Id. 
 136. Id. at 3171 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 137. Id. at 3170–71 (explaining how the decision may increase or decrease the President’s 
control depending on the circumstances). 
 138. This raises the question of what “good cause” might require.  The Court states that 
neither its precedents nor the Government suggested that disagreement with policies or 
priorities would be good cause for removal. See id. at 3157 (majority opinion).  For a helpful 
discussion of reading “good cause” in light of constitutional concerns, see John F. Manning, 
The Independent Counsel Statute:  Reading “Good Cause” in Light of Article II, 83 MINN. 
L. REV. 1285 (1999). 
 139. Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3171 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
2011] ABOLISHING AGENCY INDEPENDENCE 2565 
President cannot remove Commissioners except for cause, and therefore 
cannot adequately oversee their work.  The Court draws a line at the second 
layer, but the decision rests on broad principles that do not distinguish 
between layer one and layer two—the analysis suggests both are 
unconstitutional. 
Moreover, the Court’s proof implicates the independent agencies by 
analogy:  the President’s relationship to the SEC is as the SEC’s 
relationship is to the Board.  This analogy could lead to the conclusion that 
the President’s control over the Commission is not sufficient for precisely 
the same reason that the Commissioners’ control over the Board is not 
sufficient:  “The Commissioners are not responsible for the Board’s actions.  
They are only responsible for their own determination of whether the Act’s 
rigorous good-cause standard is met.”140
B.  A Workable Remedy:  Separating Independence from the Independent 
Agencies 
  Similarly, the President is not 
responsible for the Commissioners’ actions.  He is only responsible for 
determining whether the good-cause standards are met.  By analogy, such 
limited responsibility does not satisfy the Constitution’s requirements 
because, as the Court repeatedly emphasizes, the President must be fully 
responsible for the work of executive officers as part of his duty to take care 
that the laws be faithfully executed.  The logical implication of the Court’s 
proof is that statutory restrictions of even one layer on the President’s 
removal power are unconstitutional. 
The Court’s opinion presents a robust understanding of the constitutional 
grounds for full presidential control of executive branch officials based on 
separation of powers and the vesting of executive power in the President.  
Severance highlights the importance of these principles.  The Court’s 
remedy can be seen as a masterful choice:  minimal in this particular 
decision, leaving the Board and its functions intact, while establishing a 
plausible remedy for future judicial dismantling of agency independence. 
The Court’s severance remedy provides a means of targeting agency 
independence—not just the second layer, but also the first—without taking 
the more radical step of abolishing the independent agencies.  This 
mitigates one of the main concerns expressed with overturning Humphrey’s 
Executor, which is that the Court will not and cannot dismantle the 
independent agencies because they are an entrenched part of the federal 
government.  The Court’s remedy is based on the idea that “the existence of 
the Board does not violate the separation of powers, but the substantive 
removal restrictions imposed by [the statute] do.”141
 
 140. Id. at 3154 (majority opinion). 
  This simple move, 
separating the independence from the independent agency, provides a 
model for future cases.  The Court adopts a remedy that can bring 
 141. Id. at 3161. 
2566 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79 
independent agencies fully under the President’s supervision, while 
allowing those agencies to otherwise continue with their statutory duties. 142
In light of the historical growth and entrenchment of the independent 
agencies, the Court’s remedy of separating the independence from the 
independent agency fits the judicial role.  The Court has determined that the 
Constitution requires presidential oversight and accountability through the 
removal power.  The remedy has a minimalist result by which the Court 
severs the portion of the Act that most offends the constitutionality of the 
Board—the double for-cause removal protections.
   
143  The Board, however, 
may continue with its statutory duties, only now subject to at-will removal 
by the Commission.  As the Court explains, severing the for-cause removal 
protection for the Board, “affects the conditions under which those officers 
might some day be removed, and would have no effect, absent a 
congressional determination to the contrary, on the validity of any officer’s 
continuance in office.”144
Severance provides a remedy with much further potential to reach new 
contexts, precisely because it minimizes disruption to the affected agencies.  
Yet commentators have identified only the narrowness in this particular 
case, focusing on how the Court leaves in place the first layer of 
independence, the removal provisions protecting the SEC.  For example, 
Peter Strauss suggested that the Court affirmatively endorsed the 
constitutionality of agency independence because “[t]he constitutionality of 
the PCAOB’s authority could not . . .  have been sustained without 
accepting the single level of ‘for cause’ protection the majority attributed to 
the SEC.”
 
145  Similarly, Jack Beermann argued, “By embracing ‘single’ for 
cause restrictions on the discharge of most executive officials including the 
heads of independent agencies, the Roberts Court has in essence approved 
the independence of independent agencies.”146
As discussed above, however, the Court does not have to accept or even 
uphold the Commission’s independence to reach its conclusions.  The Court 
explicitly notes that the parties did not request the Court to reexamine its 
earlier removal power precedents and that the Court does not do so in this 
  They argue that logically 
the Court must have endorsed the constitutionality of the first layer of 
agency independence.  This is one way to understand the Court’s opinion. 
 
 142. Id. (“Concluding that the removal restrictions are invalid leaves the Board removable 
by the Commission at will, and leaves the President separated from Board members by only 
a single level of good-cause tenure.  The Commission is then fully responsible for the 
Board’s actions, which are no less subject than the Commission’s own functions to 
Presidential oversight.”). 
 143. Id. (explaining that severance allows the Court to “limit the solution to the 
problem”).  See Miller, supra note 18, at 44–45 (arguing that “Congress may not 
constitutionally restrict the President’s power to remove officials who fail to obey . . .  
presidential instructions” but explaining that this principle could be implemented through 
interpretation and severance of offending provisions without “wholesale invalidation of 
federal statutes”). 
   144.  Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3161. 
 145. Strauss, supra note 56, at 19. 
   146.  Beermann, supra note 58, at 4. 
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case.147
Admittedly, severance leaves the relationship between the President and 
Commission intact and petitioners’ proposed remedy—an injunction against 
the continuing operations of the Board—would have been more 
consequential in this case.  Yet severance has more potential for future 
challenges and it follows from constitutional principles far more ambitious 
than the arguments raised for invalidating the Board. 
  The parties stipulated to the SEC’s removal protections and no 
party asked the Court to reconsider the constitutionality of this 
independence.  The remedy thus proceeds from this stipulation, rather than 
from a necessary holding about the constitutionality of the first layer. 
The importance of the severance remedy and its potential may be 
assessed by comparing it with the remedies proposed by petitioners.  
Petitioners’ remedies and reasoning were largely limited to the Board and 
other similar entities and so would not have created a framework for a 
broader assault on agency independence.  By contrast, the Court’s 
severance remedy logically applies to independence more generally.  The 
Chief Justice’s opinion does not follow petitioners’ arguments.  Instead, it 
strikes out a different course, emphasizing that the vesting of the executive 
power in the President and his obligation to take care that the laws be 
faithfully executed require him to oversee and be able to remove executive 
branch officials.   
Contrary to what has been assumed by most commentators, the Court’s 
rejection of petitioners’ Appointment Clause arguments and related 
remedies establishes a firmer foundation for the President’s authority over 
executive branch officials and casts a shadow over agency independence 
generally.  For example, petitioners argued that Board members are 
principal officers requiring presidential appointment with the Senate’s 
advice and consent under the Appointments Clause.  If the Court had held 
that Board members were principal officers under the Appointments 
Clause, the holding would likely be limited to the unusual two-level tenure 
protection of the Board.   
Dissenting in the D.C. Circuit, Judge Kavanaugh would have decided the 
case in part on these grounds.  Notably, he emphasized the narrowness of 
such reasoning, which “would not itself call into question the many other 
independent agencies that dot Washington, D.C.” because the “heads of 
those agencies are appointed by and removable for cause by the 
President.”148  By contrast, “the PCAOB is uniquely structured, and a 
judicial holding invalidating it would be uniquely limited to the 
PCAOB.”149
 
 147. Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3147. 
  Judge Kavanaugh correctly observed that judicial invalidation 
of the PCAOB on these grounds would have little application to other 
independent agencies.    
 148. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 537 F.3d 667, 688 (D.C. 
Cir. 2008) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). 
 149. Id. 
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 An Appointments Clause challenge to the PCAOB cannot be easily 
analogized to the independent agencies, whose heads are already treated as 
principal officers with presidential selection and senate confirmation.  There 
may have been persuasive constitutional reasons for holding that Board 
members are principal officers,150 but a holding on these grounds would not 
advance the case against ordinary first-level agency independence.  
Moreover, in previous decisions analyzing whether an executive officer is a 
principal or inferior officer, the Court has stuck closely to the specific 
functions of that officer and his relationship to other authorities.151
In the alternative, petitioners argued that even if Board members were 
“inferior officers,” the SEC is not a Department for Appointment Clause 
purposes because its commissioners are not directly accountable to the 
President.
  In this 
case, the analysis would have had to focus on the Act, the type of functions 
undertaken by Board members, and the extent of supervision exercised by 
the Commission.  Thus, a decision on these grounds might invalidate the 
Board, but would have limited implications for other agencies. 
152  The petitioners argued that only an entity with direct 
accountability to the President could be considered a Department with the 
constitutional authority to appoint inferior officers.  If the Court had held 
that an independent agency such as the SEC was not a Department, this 
would prevent such agencies from making appointments of inferior officers.  
This would deprive the heads of independent agencies of a substantial 
power and might bring the appointment of these inferior officers within the 
control of the President.  It would not, however, provide the President any 
greater control over the heads of the independent agencies.  If the SEC were 
not a “Department,” presumably Commissioners would remain subject to 
removal only for good cause, and the President’s influence over the 
commissioners would remain attenuated.  The President might be able to 
appoint inferior officers within the SEC, but without any additional control 
over their superiors.153
 
 150. See generally Gary Lawson, The “Principal” Reason Why the PCAOB is 
Unconstitutional, 62 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 73 (2009), 
http://www.vanderbiltlawreview.org/articles/2009/11/Lawson-62-Vand-L-Rev-En-Banc-
73.pdf. 
  Again, a holding on these grounds might have been 
 151. See, e.g., Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 664 (1997) (discussing the specific 
duties of the Coast Guard Court of Criminal Appeals judges and their supervision by and 
accountability to other executive officers before concluding that the judges are “inferior 
officers”); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 671 (1988) (citing a number of factors for 
determining whether an officer is an inferior one but noting that “[t]he line between 
‘inferior’ and ‘principal’ officers is one that is far from clear, and the Framers provided little 
guidance into where it should be drawn”). 
 152. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 33, at *56. 
 153. Petitioners also argued that even if the SEC were considered a Department, the full 
Commission cannot appoint Board members because only the Chairman is the “Head.” Id. at 
*60.  They explained that “‘Heads of Departments’ does not connote a committee of equals” 
because a “Head” was understood at the time of the founding to be a principal or leader and 
the “Head” of the SEC is its Chairman. Id.  Accordingly, the statutory provision that vests 
appointment of the Board with the Commission is unconstitutional. See id.  Such a holding 
would be of limited long-term consequence largely for the same reasons as discussed with 
regard to petitioners’ other claims. 
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fatal for the Board, but would have few, if any, implications for agency 
independence generally. 
No doubt a decision on any of these alternative grounds would have 
generated more headlines in this case because the likely remedy would be to 
enjoin the Board’s operations, leaving uncertainty with the accounting 
industry until Congress could respond to the Court’s decision.  A holding 
based on petitioners’ Appointment Clause arguments would have the 
disadvantage of being perceived as activist in an area of significant political 
interest—the regulation of the accounting industry after a number of high-
profile difficulties and scandals.  Moreover, the reasoning would be limited 
to the Board and other similar entities with two layers of tenure protection.  
To the extent that the Court wanted to assert a broader principle about 
presidential control of the administrative state, these approaches would have 
little impact in future cases. 
Instead the Court rejects the Appointments Clause arguments and severs 
the Act’s removal provisions, which leaves the Board in place, but subject 
to full supervision by the Commission.  This may have a modest or perhaps 
even negligible impact on the Board, but follows from a series of 
constitutional principles that provide a framework for challenging agency 
independence more generally in a future case. 
It does not require much imagination to see how this remedy could easily 
apply to other independent agencies, precisely because it does not 
jeopardize the existence of these agencies, only their independence.  The 
idea of severing the Board’s tenure protections precisely targets the aspect 
of independent agencies thought to be unconstitutional—i.e., their 
independence.  The Court’s reasoning in Free Enterprise Fund suggests 
that independence from presidential control undermines the constitutional 
structure of separation of powers.  The Court’s proposed remedy aims at the 
constitutional violation.  Severance could provide a remedy that allows the 
independent agencies to continue with their statutory duties, but subject to 
at-will removal by the President and therefore under his full control and 
supervision. 
IV.  IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE CASES 
This part considers some of the implications of applying the reasoning of 
Free Enterprise Fund to one layer of agency independence.  First, I 
highlight some indications that the Court may pursue its logic and 
reexamine precedents such as Humphrey’s Executor.  Second, I briefly 
discuss some issues that may develop in future cases challenging the 
constitutionality of agency independence. 
A.   Minimalism or Marbury for the Independent Agencies? 
This Article suggests that Free Enterprise Fund establishes a framework 
for invalidating agency independence.  This raises an obvious question 
about whether the Court will reexamine Humphrey’s Executor and other 
removal power precedents in a future case.  Many commentators have 
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suggested just the opposite—that Free Enterprise Fund in fact reaffirms the 
constitutionality of the independent agencies.154
First, the opinion opens by observing: “Since 1789, the Constitution has 
been understood to empower the President to keep these [executive] officers 
accountable—by removing them from office, if necessary.  This Court has 
determined, however, that this authority is not without limit.”
  The Court, however, 
explicitly states that no party has asked for such a reexamination and the 
Court does not reexamine those precedents in this case.  But is the Court 
open to this possibility in the future?  Without hazarding a prediction of 
what the Court will do, I want to suggest that the opinion in Free Enterprise 
Fund demonstrates the Court’s openness to the possibility of invalidating 
even one layer of agency independence.  Whether such indications are 
deliberate, the opinion holds more possibilities than has generally been 
recognized. 
155  The Court 
proceeds to discuss Humphrey’s Executor and other limits on the removal 
power upheld by the Court’s precedents.156
Second, as discussed above, the logic of the opinion fits neatly with a 
challenge to ordinary, one layer agency independence.  It does not, 
however, fit very closely with the facts of the Board.  The opinion stresses 
the importance of presidential oversight and control of executive officials, 
but then allows the SEC, an independent agency, to have full removal 
power over the Board.  The Court highlights these principles in general 
terms that apply directly to independent agencies separated from the 
President’s removal power by one layer of for-cause protection.  The fourth 
footnote of the opinion makes clear that a statute cannot restrict the 
President from removing a subordinate officer when he finds it necessary.  
This approach foreshadows a challenge to agency independence generally 
by adopting an expansive view of presidential authority and by stressing the 
importance of the removal power to separation of powers. 
  This leaves a potential space 
between the constitutional authority of the President’s removal power and 
the Court’s allowance of certain limitations in Humphrey’s Executor and 
subsequent decisions.  The Court’s precedents are not equivalent to the 
Constitution as understood since 1789.  At the outset, the Court stresses the 
constitutional importance of the removal power and suggests receptivity to 
a future challenge to agency independence and the Court’s limits on the 
removal power.   
Third, the Court also notes at the beginning of the opinion that existing 
precedents are not at issue here.  After briefly noting the Court’s key 
decisions about removal, the Court states, “The parties do not ask us to 
reexamine any of these precedents, and we do not do so.”157
 
   154.  See supra notes 
  The Court 
notably does not reaffirm these precedents and it never states that 
presidential control over the SEC is constitutionally sufficient.  It is only 
52–55. 
 155. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3146 
(2010) (emphasis added) (citing Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926)). 
 156. Id. 
   157.  Id. at 3147. 
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when the time comes for the remedy that the Court severs the removal 
restrictions and leaves the Commission with the removal power for the 
simple reason that “[u]nder the traditional default rule, removal is incident 
to the power of appointment.”158
Fourth, the Court allows the parties to stipulate to the legal status of the 
Commission as an independent agency.  This stipulation allows the Court to 
structure its argument in a manner that has broader potential reach.  The 
Court accepts the parties’ stipulation, even though, as Justice Breyer points 
out, accepting this point of law creates the double layer and the 
constitutional problem in this case.
  In a future case, perhaps the Court will 
measure Humphrey’s Executor and other precedents against the 
constitutional requirements set forth in Free Enterprise Fund. 
159
Finally, choosing severance creates a general remedy for other forms of 
agency independence.  Although hardly briefed, the Court chooses 
severance without any specific considerations of the text, structure, or 
purposes of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.  By evaluating the issue in a cursory 
fashion, the majority creates a sort of presumption in favor of severance for 
invalid removal provisions.  The remedy avoids the doomsday scenario of 
abolishing the independent agencies altogether or halting their work.  
Severance simply affects “the conditions under which those officers might 
some day be removed,” but has “no effect” on the officers’ ability to 
continue in office.
  The stipulation also allows for the 
analogy to the first layer of agency independence. The Court holds that for 
the Commission to exercise effective oversight and control over the Board, 
the Commission must have the ability to remove Board members at will.  
Similarly, for the President to exercise effective oversight and control over 
an independent agency, the President must have the ability to remove the 
heads of such agencies at will.  The stipulation allows the Court to focus on 
the constitutional imperative of presidential oversight and creates an 
analogy to the first layer.   
160
Other commentators have cited some of these factors as evidence of the 
Court’s minimalism in this case.  As discussed above, they have suggested 
that the expansive constitutional principles in the opinion ring hollow in 
light of the ultimate disposition; that leaving the SEC with removal power 
over the Board reaffirms the constitutionality of the independent agencies; 
  Decoupling agency independence from the 
independent agencies creates a remedy that does not require restructuring 
the executive branch, but brings its officers within the control and removal 
authority of the President. 
 
   158.  Id. at 3161. 
 159. As Justice Breyer notes,  
The Court then, by assumption, reads into the statute books a ‘for cause removal’ 
phrase that does not appear in the relevant statute and which Congress probably 
did not intend to write.  And it does so in order to strike down, not to uphold, 
another statute.  This is not a statutory construction that seeks to avoid a 
constitutional question, but its opposite. 
Id. at 3184 (Breyer, J., dissenting).   
   160.  Id. at 3161. 
2572 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79 
and that severance leads to a result that will have no real world change in 
the Board’s operations.  
Yet I find these factors point toward a reconsideration of the 
constitutional imperative of the President’s unhampered removal power.  
The Court stresses the importance of separation of powers, the vesting of 
the executive power in the President, the responsibility of the President to 
oversee executive branch officials, and the constitutional imperative of the 
removal power for ensuring the President’s accountability.  The majority 
opinion strains to create a framework that accommodates these principles 
yet leaves the Board intact.  The principles established by the Court could 
allow for the reexamination of the constitutionality of for-cause removal 
restrictions. Whether the Court will push forward or draw back when faced 
with a direct challenge to its precedents remains to be seen.  
B.   The Severability Analysis in Future Cases 
Although the Court’s severability approach seems well designed for one 
layer of for-cause removal insulating the independent agencies, the Court 
provides little guidance for how this analysis would apply in a future 
decision.  The issue was hardly briefed by the parties.  In a short footnote at 
the end of its brief, the Government simply noted that severing for-cause 
removal provisions in the Act “would be far more consistent with 
Congress’s intentions than any broader invalidation of the Act.”161
The Court adopts the remedy of severability but provides few details 
about its application.  The Court explains that, in general, upon finding a 
part of a statute unconstitutional it will try to sever problematic portions of 
a statute while leaving the remainder intact.
  The 
Government offered severability as a last-ditch solution preferable to 
outright invalidation of the Board.  The Government’s argument for 
severing the for-cause provisions was little more than a suggestion—it did 
not offer any evidence of congressional intent with respect to severability in 
the Act’s text, structure, or purpose. 
162  With regard to the Board, 
the Court finds severance of the for-cause removal provisions appropriate 
because the “remaining provisions are not incapable of functioning 
independently, and nothing in the statute’s text or historical context makes 
it evident that Congress, faced with the limitations imposed by the 
Constitution, would have preferred no Board at all to a Board whose 
members are removable at will.”163  The Court notes that this inquiry may 
sometimes be “elusive,” but that congressional intent seems clear in this 
case.164
 
 161. Brief for the United States at *52 n.20, Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting 
Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010) (No. 08-861), 2009 WL 3290435. 
 
 162. Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3161. 
 163. Id. at 3161–62 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 164. Id. at 3161 (citation omitted).  With regard to other separation-of-powers decisions, 
however, the Court sometimes has refused to sever an unconstitutional provision.  For 
example, in Bowsher v. Synar, the Court determined that the Comptroller General, an officer 
removable by Congress, could not exercise executive powers, but that “striking the removal 
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In future cases, presumably the Court will have to consider whether a 
statutory scheme could remain operative without the removal protections 
and also whether Congress would have intended to preserve the agency 
even without its independence.  But how will such an inquiry be made?  In 
Free Enterprise Fund, the Court does not examine the text of the Act, nor 
does it consider any of the other indicators of congressional intent, such as 
the structure, purpose, or historical context.  Instead, the Court merely 
asserts that no evidence can be found that makes it “evident” Congress 
would have preferred invalidation to severing the unconstitutional for-cause 
provisions.  The inquiry is conclusory and does not aver to any specific 
evidence. 
One might surmise from the Court’s lack of discussion that in a 
subsequent case, it will rarely be “evident” that Congress would prefer to 
sacrifice an agency rather than sever its independence.  Independent 
agencies are often significant bureaucracies charged with carrying out 
comprehensive statutory schemes.  In light of this, one might expect that the 
Court will hesitate to find that the independence of an agency would trump 
Congress’s interest in having the agency at all.165  This is especially true 
given the strong presumption in favor of severability and the prevalence in 
many statutes of severability provisions.  In some cases, however, it might 
be, as Justice Breyer points out, “the only available remedy to certain 
double for-cause problems is to invalidate entire agencies.”166
C.   Some Further Implications 
  
Nevertheless, in the context of the Board, the Court has suggested that 
dismantling independent agencies is not the remedy of first choice, but 
rather the Court can sever unconstitutional removal provisions and thereby 
bring independent agencies under the control of the President. 
If the foregoing analysis is correct, then the Court in Free Enterprise 
Fund has created a framework for challenging the constitutionality of 
agency independence.  The Court sets out a proof that logically 
demonstrates how the independent agencies contravene the constitutional 
structure.  Moreover, the Court provides a remedy that would allow the 
Court to separate agency independence from the independent agencies by 
severing for-cause removal provisions.   
Given the likely resistance to overturning Humphrey’s Executor, if the 
Court faces a challenge to one of the independent agencies, it may consider 
in greater detail the statutory structure of the challenged agency.  In Free 
Enterprise Fund, Chief Justice Roberts accepts the parties’ stipulation that 
the SEC Commissioners may be removed only for cause, although this is 
 
provisions would lead to a statute that Congress would probably have refused to adopt.” 478 
U.S. 714, 734–35 (1986). 
 165. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 933–35 (1983) (discussing the severability of the 
one-house legislative veto held to be unconstitutional and relying on the statutory 
severability provisions as well as the legislative history to conclude that the presumption in 
favor of severability was not rebutted). 
 166. Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3182 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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nowhere specified in the statute.167
If such a challenge, however, were to be raised in a future case, the Court 
may pay more attention to statutory questions about agency independence 
in order to minimize disruption to these agencies.
  In addition, no party challenged the 
constitutional validity of Humphrey’s Executor and the first layer of for-
cause removal limits. 
168  As a preliminary 
matter, Humphrey’s Executor considered whether the Federal Trade 
Commission Act’s for-cause removal grounds were exclusive.169  The 
statute did not provide any words of exclusivity, but the Court explained 
that the text and structure of the statute led to the conclusion that such terms 
were exclusive.170  Similarly, in Free Enterprise Fund, the statute that 
governed the Board did not expressly make its grounds for removal 
exclusive.171  The Court found the exclusivity implied because the statute 
provided for removal for good cause shown and specified findings and 
procedures for removal.  This structure would not make sense “if Board 
members could also be removed without any finding at all.”172
Faced with a direct challenge to an independent agency, the Court may 
decide to examine the specific statutory language more carefully, 
particularly because the statutes governing the independent agencies differ.  
In some instances, the removal limitations are simply assumed, as with the 
SEC.  Other statutes provide that removal may be had “for cause” without 
stating the specific causes.
  This 
reasoning follows from the well-established precedent in Humphrey’s 
Executor—for-cause removal provisions are generally read to be exclusive 
grounds for removal even when the statute does not explicitly provide for 
exclusivity. 
173  Some statutes list the specific grounds for 
removal without any language of exclusivity; other statutes indicate that the 
statutory causes are the exclusive ones.174
 
 167. See id. at 3182–84 (arguing that the majority simply assumes that SEC 
Commissioners are removable “for cause” even though the statute is silent on this point and 
the SEC statute was enacted between Myers and Humphrey’s Executor when such for-cause 
removal provisions were thought to be unconstitutional). 
  The statutory variation could be 
examined in greater detail to see whether it corresponds to real differences 
between the specific statutory schemes.  The Court may decide to treat 
these different formulations as meaningful variation between the statutes, or 
may plausibly conclude that they are drafting differences of no consequence 
 168. See Miller, supra note 18, at 86 (arguing that statutes creating the independent 
agencies may be saved through interpretation). 
 169. Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 610–11 (1935). 
 170. Id. at 611. 
 171. See Brief for the United States, supra note 161, at *51 n.19. 
 172. Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3158 n.7. 
 173. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 242 (2006) (providing that members of the Federal Reserve 
Board “shall hold office for a term of fourteen years from the expiration of the term of his 
predecessor, unless sooner removed for cause by the President”). 
 174. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 41 (2006) (providing for the Federal Trade Commission that 
“[a]ny Commissioner may be removed by the President for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or 
malfeasance in office”), with 42 U.S.C. § 7171(b)(1) (2006) (providing for the Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission that members “may be removed by the President only for 
inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office”) (emphasis added). 
2011] ABOLISHING AGENCY INDEPENDENCE 2575 
given the strong background understanding since Humphrey’s Executor that 
limitations on the President’s removal power are read to be exclusive. 
In a different vein, after Free Enterprise Fund, the President may seek to 
test the limits of good cause removal by exercising greater control over 
independent agencies and using removal if agency heads do not comply 
with his directives.  Perhaps the government will push to reconcile 
presidential control with the statutory limits on removal by arguing for a 
broader conception of what constitutes good cause.  Questions about what 
constitutes good cause remain relatively open because of the paucity of 
challenges and decisions in this area.175
Moreover, if the Court were to invalidate the removal protections for an 
independent agency, and thereby overrule Humphrey’s Executor, the new 
framework would shift the balance between the political branches.  
Allowing full supervision by the President of the independent agencies 
diminishes congressional control, at least to the extent that it bolsters 
presidential control.  One might expect that Congress will not sit quietly by 
the sidelines if the Court shifts power over such agencies to the President 
and thereby presumably diminishes some of Congress’s authority.  Trying 





  In any event, a judicial decision upsetting agency 
independence would lead the political branches to compete for power under 
this constitutional framework and it is difficult to predict how such 
competition would play out between the branches. 
Free Enterprise Fund answers a modest question about a federal agency 
that enjoys a double layer of tenure protection.  The Court determines that 
the second layer goes too far—it diffuses the President’s oversight and 
control beyond the Court’s precedents.  The Court emphasizes formal 
constitutional principles in the course of reaching this holding:  the 
President must oversee executive branch officers; such oversight requires 
the removal power; and Congress cannot diminish or modify the removal 
power.  The decision sets forth a logical proof that leads to a limited 
conclusion in this case, but its implications go beyond the Board and raise 
questions about the constitutionality of even one layer of agency 
independence.  The opinion stresses throughout that a statute cannot prevent 
the President from removing an officer he believes is not faithfully 
executing the laws—a conclusion that logically implies the 
unconstitutionality of agency independence.  Whether, or in what fashion, 
the Court applies its logic to the independent agencies remains to be seen. 
 
 175. See Miller, supra note 18, at 86–87. 
 176. One can, however, imagine some possibilities.  Threatened by the expansion of 
presidential authority over these agencies, Congress might seek to restructure the duties or 
obligations of the independent agencies—it could reduce their authority and power, but 
rolling back the administrative state may prove politically and practically difficult.  More 
plausibly, Congress might try to redirect control over these agencies through appropriations 
and the exercise of its oversight authority. 
